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Introduction
In the last few decades, human trafficking has become a growing phenomenon worldwide.
The illicit trade in human beings across borders violates the human rights of victims, threatens national security and deteriorates the health of the affected economies and societies by increasing the size of the shadow economy and organized criminal activities (Belser 2005) .
Although the exact magnitudes and dimensions of the problem are unknown, available statistics suggest that human trafficking is one of the most serious transnational crimes in the Given the growing significance of international human trafficking, it is no surprise that the international community has adopted several measures in the past ten years, including the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2000, hereinafter the "Convention" or "Protocol"). Accordingly, social scientists have started to turn their attention towards policies enacted to combat human trafficking. 1 One of the problems scholars face is the lack of reliable data on countries' anti-trafficking policies which can be and Violence Protection Act (TVPA). However, the tier ranking has several drawbacks, 3 which limit its reliability and relevance. 3 In particular, while the tier ranking provides an aggregate score of compliance with anti-trafficking policies, it fails to recognize the different levels of compliance in the three main policy dimensions -prosecution, protection and prevention. Separating these three dimensions is important. Theory and evidence indicate that better protection policy may encourage potential victims to risk illegal migration, which could lead them to fall prey to traffickers. Human trafficking inflows might therefore increase as a consequence, contradicting the objectives of prosecution and prevention policies (Akee et al. 2010) . Countries can thus have the same overall ranking on the index, but for very different reasons. 4 We develop novel and original indices of anti-trafficking policies around the world, providing better, more detailed and disaggregated measures of the three prime policy dimensions enacted by countries. Specifically, we use raw data from two reports on human Our results show that compliance with prosecution policy was highest, on average, for all years, and experienced the most significant improvement during the period. Our index suggests that governmental efforts to protect victims of human trafficking remain weaker than their efforts to criminalize traffickers and prevent the crime of human trafficking. It thus seems that countries take the 'justice and prevention' aspect of the crime more seriously than the human rights aspect which regards human trafficking as a matter of protecting vulnerable individuals from exploitation. 3 The decision rule of the tier-ran king is not transparent to the public. It is not clear how the three levels of the ranking -full co mpliance, significant efforts and no significant efforts -are assessed and determined, making the ranking vulnerable to subjectivity (GA O 2006) . It has been argued the tier-ran king is largely a tool of the U.S. government to influence other country's policies through 'naming' and 'shaming' (Simmons and Lloyd 2010) . It is determined based on evaluation of compliance with the Un ited States' domestic anti-trafficking lawthe Vict ims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA 2000) -rather than international law. Its relevance for evaluating international standards is therefore limited. 4 A number of countries in full co mp liance with the tier-ranking fail to ensure the basic legal rights of victims, punishing and deporting them, while demonstrating sound policy interventions in the other dimensions (prosecution and prevention). For instance, in the tier 1 group, victims in France and the United Kingdom were reportedly imp risoned and deported due to their act ions related to the situations in which they were trafficked in 2008 and 2009 (U.S. Department of State, 2009 and 2010) .
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We find that compliance with (overall) anti-trafficking policies significantly decreases with corruption and is higher in countries that also respect the rights of women. The share of women legislators in parliament, membership in international regimes, per capita GDP, and loans from the United States do not affect compliance at conventional levels of significance, while the effect of democracy depends on how we estimate our regressions.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we introduce our indices on anti-trafficking policies. Section 3 describes the development of these policies across countries and over time.
Our application on what determines anti-trafficking policies follows in section 4, where we briefly provide our theory, method of estimation, and data. We discuss our results in section 5.
The final section concludes the paper.
Novel Measures of Anti-trafficking Policies
In response to the emergence of human trafficking onto the international policy arena, several Our novel and original indices are coded to reflect countries' policies in these three dimensions. We decompose each dimension into several important requirements prescribed by the Protocol and evaluate compliance for each of them. Compliance with these requirements is independently evaluated by at least two trained coders based on clearly instructed coding guidelines and decision rules. In the rare case of disagreement between the two coders (less than 10%), the principal investigators decided on the scores. The scores for each dimension are aggregated to a five-point scale ranging from 1 to 5, where the highest value indicates full compliance and the lowest value no compliance.
The raw data are derived from two reports on human trafficking, the Annual Report of Naturally, our index is not free from potential criticisms. Criticism might arise with the ordinal structure of the scores. Such ordinal scaling is required in order to rank antitrafficking performance of countries. However, the ordinal scores cannot capture all the detailed, country-specific information. In addition, our index does not differentiate policy requirements specifically by country-types (e.g., destination, origin, and transit). This is because the Anti-trafficking Protocol imposes the three core policy obligations on all countries and also because many countries belong to more than one of the three groups at the 11 Feld and Voigt (2003) point out in the context of judicial independence that de-jure pro mises might not achieve de-facto changes. In our case, anti-trafficking is a new concept recently introduced in international and national legal systems and thus the adoption of a law criminalizing such activit ies is critical to prosecuting perpetuators, suggesting the interdependence of the de-jure and de-facto dimensions of the anti-trafficking prosecution policy. 12 A strong scale is defined as an H greater than 0.5 (Mokken 1971).
8 same time. However, we admit that this generalization may not take account of specific policy needs for different types of countries.
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The 3P-index is available for up to 180 countries over the 2000-2010 period. We illustrate data availability and global and regional average scores for selected years in Table 1 .
As can be seen, the relevant information becomes available for more countries over time.
Unsurprisingly, developed countries perform better than the rest of the world. European and OECD countries demonstrate the highest commitments to anti-trafficking policies in all of the three dimensions, while efforts are minimal and even decreasing in South Asia and the Middle East in recent years. The quantile map in Figure 1 gives a first impression of the data (for 2010 -the most recent available year). Table 1 is based on all available information with changing country samples over time. In order to detect policy changes over time, we prefer to fix the sample to those countries that have data available over the entire period of time. This is done in figures 13 For instance, prevention policy -including border controls -is crucial fo r transit countries, while protection policy is less important, given that victims of human trafficking do not stay in these countries for a long time. 14 According to the Anti-trafficking Protocol (2000), victim protection includes assistance and legal support in order to allo w victims to recover fro m the exp loitation experienced as a consequence of having been trafficked (see part II of the Protocol). Such exp loitation is against the right to individual self-determination advocated by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) . This suggests that the sub-indices are individually relevant and the disaggregation into the three dimensions captures differences in compliance across countries with each of the 3Ps.
Descriptive Evidence
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The table also shows the modest levels of correlation between each of the 3Ps and the tierranking. The correlation of 0.69 between the aggregate 3P index and the tier-ranking suggests that both measures capture the general direction of the development of anti-trafficking policies, but are to some extent different. We stress that compared to the tier-ranking, our index does not rely on a single informational source, but integrates all available information in order to minimize potential biases one informational source may have.
Application: The Determinants of Anti-trafficking policies
In this section we apply the new index to re-investigate the determinants of anti-trafficking policies. In choosing our variables of interest we follow the specification in Bartilow (2010).
His dependent variable is the level of compliance with the United States 2000 Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA). The U.S. Department of State reports a ranking of countries with respect to their actions to fight human trafficking, on a scale of 1-10 3. 16 On the original scale, countries whose governments fully comply with the TVPA receive the lowest value (tier 1). Countries with governments not fully complying with the minimum standards required but exerting a significant effort to achieve full compliance, are ranked medium (tier 2), while countries with governments that do not fully comply and do not exert significant efforts are ranked highest (tier 3). 17 We recode the ranking so that higher values are deemed "better." We use this dependent variable only in a baseline regression for comparative reasons. Our main estimations are based on our newly constructed antitrafficking policy variables.
Our regressions are based on pooled time-series cross-section (panel) data, covering the 2002-2009 period. 18 We use robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, to account for the fact that observations from the same country in different years are not independent observations. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. Still following Bartilow, we include the temporal lag of the dependent variable, which turns out to be highly significant according to all specifications. Our preferred estimation equation takes the following form:
where , represents our measures of anti-trafficking policies in country at year , , is the vector of explanatory variables, and represent country and year fixed effects respectively, and , represents the idiosyncratic error term.
The dependent variables are categorical and ordinal, for which in principle ordered probit or ordered logit would be the most appropriate estimators. However, the larger the number of categories, the less persuasive the case for using ordered probit or logit (Wooldridge 2002) and our aggregate 3P index has 15 categories. Moreover, Hausman tests strongly call for the inclusion of country fixed effects to avoid omitted variable bias from unobserved country heterogeneity (see equation (1)), which is facilitated by using a linear estimator like ordinary least squares (OLS) or the system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . We therefore use both ordered probit, OLS and system GMM.
16 Bartilow (2010) uses a fourth category relying on information on how a country's policies evolve co mpared to the previous year (i.e., whether the country is on the "watchlist"). We do not follow this coding, as "tier 2" and "tier 2-watchlist" reflect the same level of compliance. 
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Appendix B shows the exact definitions of all variables with their sources, while Appendix C reports descriptive statistics.
Results
Column 1 of Table 3 replicates the analysis of Bartilow (2010) . We do however include a dummy for each year.
As can be seen in column 1, the quality of a country's anti-trafficking policy improves with the perceived absence of corruption and a more democratic regime, at the one percent level of statistical significance. At the ten percent level, a higher share of women in parliament and better women's rights on the CIRI indicator are correlated with stricter policies against human trafficking. The lagged dependent variable is significant at the one percent level, with the expected positive coefficient. Per capita GDP, U.S. aid, and international regime membership are not significant at conventional levels.
Column 2 replicates the analysis using our overall 3P index as the dependent variable instead. As can be seen, the results are largely unchanged. The exception is the control of corruption index, which turns out to be marginally insignificant.
Given that our 3P index contains 15 categories, OLS seems suitable as well. Given that it also eases the quantitative interpretation of the coefficients, we report OLS results in columns 3 and 4. While column 3 excludes country fixed effects, column 4 includes them.
Excluding fixed effects, the results are almost identical to the ordered probit specification.
However, once we include them, the control of corruption index is significant at the five percent level, while the share of women in the legislature is no longer significant at conventional levels. Surprisingly, the coefficient of democracy reverses its sign, but is only significant at the ten percent level.
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With the temporally lagged dependent variable and the country fixed effects simultaneously included in the estimations, our results could be biased and inconsistent in a 13 short panel (Nickell 1981) . We therefore proceed with the system GMM estimator as developed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) (which must be absent from the data in order for the estimator to be consistent), do not reject the specification at conventional levels and thus support our choice of which variables to model as exogenous.
The results from column 5 are similar to those obtained previously with ordered probit and OLS (excluding country fixed effects), with control of corruption now being significant at the five percent level. In columns 6 and 7 we replicate the results excluding the three variables that are never significant at conventional levels (international regime membership, per capita GDP and U.S. aid), with similar results.
Quantitatively, we find that an increase in the democracy index by one point increases the 3P index by 0.07 points. In order to increase the 3P index by one point (which is the This is the distance in corruption between, e.g., Afghanistan and Nicaragua in the year 2000.
In Table 4 we focus on the individual dimensions of the 3P index. We estimate the model with GMM, despite the ordinal nature of the five-scale variables. This is because controlling for country fixed effects and addressing the problem of endogeneity is arguably more important than ignoring the ordinal nature of the dependent variables, in particular when we include the spatial lag variables below. We report specifications including regime membership, GDP per capita and U.S. aid, and excluding them. Note that the Arellano-Bond test rejects the regressions focusing on the prosecution index (columns 3 and 4). We therefore include the second lag of the dependent variable (in columns 5 and 6). This specification is not rejected at conventional levels. variables, which enter jointly in the estimation models (k stands for countries other than i).
We row-standardize all weighting matrices, such that the spatial lag variables represent the weighted average of policies in other countries. All spatial lag variables are temporally lagged by one year since it is unlikely that countries could react to the policies of other countries immediately (i.e., in the same year).
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We choose our weights with a view to account for a variety of different potential transmission channels. Specifically, as weighting variables we use information on the identity of the major transit and source countries for each destination country, contiguity (two countries share a land border or are separated by less than 150 miles of sea distance), bilateral trade, similarity in voting on issues regarded as key by the United States' Department of State in the United Nations General Assembly, and a civilizational dummy.
Transit and source countries are vulnerable to pressure from their major destination countries since the effectiveness of policies in the latter requires the ratcheting-up of policies in the former. Note that the sample including this spatial lag is thus reduced to countries which function as major transit or origin countries as we assume that these countries experience pressure from destination countries. The relevant spatial lag variable is undefined for countries that do not fall into this category.
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Contiguity and bilateral trade predominantly capture externalities. A country contiguous to other countries k is likely to experience the strongest impact of any externality generated by policy choices in countries k. This is because contiguous countries tend to be close substitutes as either destination, transit or origin countries. The same is true for countries which trade a lot with each other, not least because flows of people often follow flows of goods and services. Of course, contiguity and bilateral trade do not exclusively capture externality effects, but will also partly cover learning and emulation effects if countries learn from or emulate those countries of geographical proximity or economic
importance. Yet, we assume that learning and emulation effects are predominantly captured by the similarity of voting and the civilizational belonging of countries. Countries wishing to learn from or emulate other countries will seek those with which they share common political views and/or values. The similarity of voting in the UN General Assembly, particularly on key issues, captures the similarity of political views, while countries belonging to the same civilization, such as the Western, Islamic, African, Latin American, Sinic or Hindu ones, are likely to share common values.
Spatial lag variables cannot be exogenous: If country i were to be affected by the policies of other countries, the policies of other countries will also be affected by the policies chosen by country i. Rather than applying spatial maximum likelihood techniques, which are computationally difficult to implement, in Table 5 we use the system GMM estimator, Prosecution policies diffuse among contiguous countries, with the relevant spatial lag statistically significant at the one percent level. This most likely captures an externality effect.
Contiguous countries are exposed to the effect of stricter policies in neighboring countries and thus adopt their own policies. If contiguous countries increased the strictness of their antitrafficking policies by one point in the previous year, we estimate the country under observation to tighten its own policy by 0.3-0.4 points. In other words, the (short-run) speed of policy diffusion is less than one half and thus diffuses more slowly than prevention and protection policies. 27 The traffic link-weighted spatial lag variable is statistically significant 25 We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that the existing spatial econometrics literature does not provide insights on how to best estimate models with such complexit ies involved as ours. To the best of our knowledge, the only published paper with an analogous setup is Gassebner et al. (2011) . They use the same methods of estimation as we employ here. 26 Note that the sum of the coefficients of the spatial lag and the lagged dependent variable exceed unity in some model specifications. This would imp ly an explosive process if interpreted as a non-changing long-run relationship. However, in the context of the limited time-series we focus on, the sum of the coefficients does not need to be below unity since diffusion might resemb le an explosive process to start with, and then significantly slow down as time passes. 27 One concern with spatial autoregressive models is that, despite our conservative research design, the spatial lag variab les pick up the co mmon movement of countries toward stricter policies over time. To check whether this is the case, we employed a placebo test: we generated spatial lag variab les with randomly generated weights. Since none of the spatial lag variables with these random weights resulted in estimated coefficients that were with a negative coefficient. Rather than stricter prosecution policies in destination countries resulting in stricter prosecution policies in their major transit and origin countries, it appears that they function as substitutes: the latter group of countries get away with laxer prosecution policies knowing that the destination countries prosecute more vigorously.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced new measures of countries' policies aimed at combating international trafficking in human beings. Our aggregate policy index is fine-grained and based on the consistent coding of a wide range of informational sources, while our disaggregated measures capture the three different fundamental dimensions of anti-trafficking policies, namely prevention, protection and prosecution.
Unsurprisingly, we find that the developed world performs better than the rest of the world. European and OECD countries demonstrate the highest commitments to antitrafficking policies in all of the three dimensions, while efforts are lower and even decreasing over recent years in South Asia and the Middle East. Globally, compliance with prosecution policy was highest for all years and followed the steepest upward trend. The average prevention policy score also increased substantially over the 2000-2010 period, while our index suggests that governments' efforts to protect victims of human trafficking remain weaker than their efforts to criminalize traffickers and to prevent the crime of human trafficking. This indicates that, in terms of compliance with anti-trafficking policy, countries take the 'justice and prevention' aspect of the crime more seriously than the human rights aspect which regards human trafficking as a matter of protecting vulnerable individuals from exploitation.
We applied the new data to investigate the determinants of anti-trafficking policies empirically. The results show that compliance with (overall) anti-trafficking policies significantly decreases with corruption and is higher in countries that also respect the rights of women. The share of women legislators in parliament, membership in international regimes, per capita GDP, and loans from the United States do not affect compliance at conventional significant at conventional levels, we are confident that our spatial lag variab les with theoretically motivated weights are not simply picking up these common trends toward tighter policies over time. 28 To test for robustness, we use the period average of trade and voting in the UNGA as weights, such that any over-time variat ion in the spatial lag variables exclusively derives fro m variation in the policies of other countries, not from variation in the weights. These additional regressions generate similar results, but additionally suggest that countries look towards politically similar countries' previous policies when determin ing their overall anti-trafficking policies, while this spatial lag variable now beco mes marginally insignificant for protection policies. levels of significance, while the effect of democracy depends on how we estimate our regressions.
We also provide preliminary evidence on the spread of anti-trafficking policies across countries. The results suggest that prevention and protection policies follow those of countries with similar voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly, most likely capturing learning or emulation effects. In setting prosecution policies, countries seem to follow their contiguous neighbors, which most likely captures externality effects. Given the complex nature of spatial dependence in our model and insufficient knowledge on the appropriate method of estimation, these results remain preliminary. We leave a more comprehensive analysis of the diffusion of anti-trafficking policies across countries for future research.
Our new indices can be applied to answer a wide range of questions. Scholars may wish to use the aggregate index if they are interested in overall policies, but we strongly recommend that future research analyzes the different dimensions of overall policies separately and in greater detail than we could do here. For example, protection policies mainly protect victims, while prosecution policies mainly target the perpetrators. Why countries choose to pursue one type of policy rather than the other deserves closer scrutiny. (2000, 2005 and 2010) Note: Number of countries in parentheses. 
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(1) Table 4 : Anti-Trafficking Policies (prevention, prosecution, and protection), GMM, 2002 GMM, -2010 Notes: The dependent variables are the Prevention index (columns 1-2), the Prosecution Index (Columns 3-6), and the Protection index (columns 7-8). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. A dummy for each year is included. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses; * (**, ***) indicates significance at 10 (5, 1) percent level.
(1) Table 5 : Anti-Trafficking Policies (spatial lags), GMM, 2002 GMM, -2010 Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. A dummy for each year is included. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses; * (**, ***) indicates significance at 10 (5, 1) percent level.
(1) The country has a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons and; the law is fully enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders. Generally, the country should maintain a stringent level of penalty (either more than five years imprisonment or punishment equivalent to other related crimes such as rape or labor exploitation).
Score 4:
The country has a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons; BUT the law is not fully enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders.
Score 3:
The country does NOT have a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons; but applies some other relevant laws (such as laws against rape, slavery, exploitation, abuse or human rights violation) to punish offenders of such crimes; and the law is fully or adequately enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders.
Score 2:
The country does NOT have a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons; BUT applies some other related law to punish offenders of such crimes; the law is not adequately enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders. If the country has a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons but does not enforce the law at all (or there is no evidence that the country has conducted prosecution or conviction of such offenders), it also receives score 2.
33
Score 1:
The country does NOT have a legislative measure prohibiting trafficking in persons and no other law is applied; and there is no evidence of punishment for such a crime at all.
Protection
Coding Scheme
In measuring government protection policy, our primary interests are: whether the country protects the human rights of victims of trafficking; identifies them; and provides for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of trafficking by legislative and other measures.
Score 5:
The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts STRONG efforts to
give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation.
Score 4:
The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts MODERATE efforts to give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation.
The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts LIMITED efforts to
give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation. Or, if the country fails to ensure that victims of trafficking are never punished for acts related to the trafficking itself or the consequences of 34 being trafficking BUT exerts STRONG/Moderate efforts in protecting victims, the country qualifies for score 3.
The country fails to ensure that victims of trafficking are punished for acts related to the trafficking itself or to the consequences of being trafficked; and there is limited assistance and support for court proceedings and the recovery of victims. Or, the country does not punish victims of trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked; however, does not provide any assistance or support for recovery, rehabilitation and repatriation.
The country punishes victims of trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked; and does not provide any assistance and support.
Prevention
In measuring government prevention policy, our primary interests are; whether the country establishes and practices comprehensive policies, programs and other measures to prevent and combat trafficking in persons. The country demonstrates NO efforts against trafficking in persons. 
